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It would appear that the capital inflow dilemma is not an 
external problem--it is an eternal one.
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For three decades, the predominantly prevailing presumption among economic analysts 
and financial authorities was that the flow of financial capital would become increasingly freer.  
More freely flowing capital implied a more important role for international developments in 
shaping market interest rates (as discussed in Reinhart and Reinhart, 2011) and larger net flows 
of capital and corresponding current account imbalances.  The theory was that market forces 
leading to changes in relative prices would direct the appropriate flow of resources. This 
underpinned advice from advanced-economy forums, such as the G-7, and international 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, and was collectively referred to as the 
triumph of the Anglo-Saxon model.   
There were three flaws, however, in this intellectual edifice.  First, not all countries were 
receptive to allowing changes in a key relative price—their exchange rate.  Many retained what 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) termed a “fear of floating” for the reasons explained in that paper.   In 
                                                          
1 This is note based on the introduction for the Spanish translation of Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent R.Reinhart 
(2008), “Capital Inflows and Reserve Accumulation:  The Recent Evidence” forthcoming in Banco Central de 
Reserva del Perú, Revista Estudios Económicos..   
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 Twenty years ago Guillermo Calvo, Leonardo Leiderman, and Carmen M. Reinhart (CLR) wrote a series of papers 
on the proximate causes of surges in capital inflows and the policy dilemmas these created. They stressed the 
important role played by low international interest rates (notably in the US) and ample global liquidity in fueling a 
search for yield in investments in emerging markets (see CLR, 1994 for a summary). The policy challenges faced by 
many emerging markets at present, as they lean against the wind and try to mitigate the economic impacts of the 
inflows has not changed all that much, as discussed in this note.  The CLR papers warned against the vulnerability 
of sudden capital flow reversals. 
 the face of pressures that would otherwise have led to an appreciation of their home currency, 
those authorities intervened in the foreign exchange market, sometimes accumulating massive 
stocks of reserves.  Second, many countries continued to use other levers of policy to influence 
capital flows in the manner described in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008).  Indeed, an amazing 
assortment of rules allowing restrictions on financial flows sits on the books of emerging market 
economies.  They take a variety of names:  prudential reserve requirements, taxes on hot money, 
and stamp duties, among others.  They are not always currently in force, but they can be in the 
future.  And, third, the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 set back the self-assurance of those 
focused exclusively on markets. 
This sets the stage for a debate at the highest levels of officialdom about the future of 
open capital markets.  Advocates of increased regulation and direct controls have two 
advantages.  For one, many mechanisms that put sand in the gears of international finance can be 
described as prudential measures.  These include increasing reserve requirements, requiring a 
larger liquidity buffer of “safe” domestic assets, and raising taxes on some forms of financial 
income.  For another, there had been a coordination problem for the prior thirty years restraining 
those wanting to stem the tide of increased financial openness.  Proposals offered by one or two 
countries could be dismissed because those going alone would only lose market share in a 
competitive global trading system.  The financial crisis has inclined many authorities in many 
countries to act at the same time, making a multilateral effort more likely. 
We will argue that global economic developments will intensify the pressure for a return 
of financial repression.  If this is correct, after the fact, the past thirty years will seem a quaint 
replay of the pre-Great-War heyday of capital mobility.  Another golden age will have come and 
gone.  The chronology of the extent of capital mobility in chapter 10 of Reinhart and Rogoff 
 (2009) indicates that the last sustained stretch of significant restraint on global finance was 
immediately on the heels of World War II.  Whether restrictions on finance should be mostly 
remembered for facilitating the rapid rebuilding of the 1950s and 1960s or ushering in the 
imbalances of the 1970s remains an open issue. 
Without question, financial crises are costly in real economic terms.  In a paper for the 
recent Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson-Hole Symposium called “After the Fall,” 
we looked at economic performance surrounding fifteen severe financial crises in the second half 
of the twentieth century (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2010).  Some of the results are presented in the 
table below, although in a different form than in the paper.   
The shaded row gives average economic performance across countries in the year of the 
crisis.  After a severe financial crisis, economies tend to go deeply into recession (column 1), 
recover only slowly, and settle onto a growth path lower than the average performance in the 
decade prior to the crisis.  The unemployment rate (column 2) remains elevated.  Equity prices 
are more coincident with the crisis and rebound relatively quickly, but real house prices continue 
to decline for most of the decade after the crisis.   
 Median behavior surrounding fifteen severe financial crises  
in the 20th century       
                                                                        Real   
 Growth of Unemploy- Change in  house    
 Real GDP ment Equity  prices   
 per capita Rate Prices  T-1=100   
   Percent    level   
T-10 to T-6 3.3 4.1 8.1  73.3   
T-5 to T-2 4.4 3.5 14.5  92.1   
T-1                3.2 3.4 -15.1  100.0   
T (Crisis)            1.6 5.1 -27.6   95.1   
T+1               -5.8 6.8 -4.5  83.7   
T+2 to T+5 3.0 9.0 10.9  76.4   
T+6 to T+10 3.8 6.2 12.1  82.8   
        
Source:  Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart, "After the Fall," Jackson Hole Symposium, 8/2010, at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2010/reinhart-paper.pdf. 
 
This panel has discouraging implications for the global distribution of economic growth.  
The advanced economies (often referred to as the “North” in the economics literature) were the 
center of the systemic financial crises.  Emerging market economies (the “South”) may have 
fallen into recession, but they were mostly pushed by their trading partners not pulled in by their 
financial institutions.  If the advanced economies follow the pattern of prior recoveries from 
severe financial crises, they will grow only sluggishly and unemployment will stay elevated.  
Emerging market economies do not share that impediment. 
The figure below shows real GDP growth for the past thirty years in those two regions.  
Advanced economies, the dashed line, had already been growing more slowly than emerging 
market economies, the solid line, for a decade.  If the advanced economies do not fare better than 
the precedent in the aftermath of systemic financial crisis suggests, then this growth gap will 
only widen.  There are many implications of a stretched regional growth imbalance for asset 
flows and prices, but we will only sketch out those related to international attitudes toward 
capital flows and reserve accumulation. 
  
First, the deep recession and initially sluggish recovery among advanced economies has 
prompted unprecedented policy action.  Many countries countered economic weakness with 
ambitious fiscal stimulus.  Those plans, however, put strains on government finances that were 
already reeling from the direct consequences of recession and crisis, including reduced tax 
collection, greater spending on automatic stabilizers, and bail-out costs as private mistakes 
became public obligations.
3
   As a result, fiscal deficits have been large, adding to already large 
debt stocks that push economies into a region associated with slower economic growth. 
Monetary policy also responded vigorously, as the major central banks slashed their 
policy interest rates and expanded their balance sheets.  In several cases, authorities pushed their 
central banks into hitherto unexplored territory.  At the point position of that expeditionary force 
has been the Federal Reserve, which eased in a manner unprecedented in speed, size, and form.   
Predictably low short-term interest rates encourage investors to seek riskier alternatives, 
some of which are offshore.  As a consequence, many other countries are receiving windfalls of 
capital flows.  In other work, we referred to episodes of unusually high capital inflows as 
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 This is the focus of chapter 14 on the aftermath of financial crises in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
 “bonanzas” (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008).  These inflows of capital are historically associated 
with pressures on the local currency to appreciate and booming domestic asset markets.   
Capital inflows can be a mixed blessing, especially in economies with thin domestic 
financial markets and when driven by investors with a short-term focus.  Often the effects in 
emerging market economies are resisted.  Many levers of policy can be applied in that endeavor.  
One that has been widely relied upon in the past few years has been currency intervention.  Many 
emerging market economies, especially those around the Pacific Rim, have settled on an export-
led growth strategy.  Key to that appears to be keeping their bilateral exchange rate stable vis-à-
vis the U.S. dollar.  But this requires them to resist currency appreciation and accumulate dollar 
reserves when the anchor country is mired in financial problems and keeps monetary policy 
accommodative in an unprecedented manner.   
Emerging market and developing economies have indeed significantly increased their 
reserves.  According to estimates of the IMF, they added $1.9 trillion to their reserve holdings 
from 2008 to 2010, or about 7-3/4 percent of their nominal income over that period.   A survey 
by the IMF, the Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, indicates that 
about two-thirds of those reserve additions are dollar denominated. 
The timeliest reading on official reserve activity is the total value of government 
securities held in custody for official entities at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(FRBNY).  Not all reserve managers managers hold all their government securities at the 
FRBNY and some hold dollar assets that are not issued by the U.S. Treasury or guaranteed by 
government agencies.  Still, the held-in-custody data are reported weekly and are large—nearly 
$3-1/2 trillion at the last observation plotted in the chart below. 
  
Note that foreign officials hold more government securities than does the Federal 
Reserve.  Also note that the pace of reserve additions picked up relative to the prior trend as the 
financial crisis heated up in 2008.  Indeed, the held-in-custody account was 22 percent higher in 
February 2011 than the trend from end-2002 to end-2007 predicted (the dashed line).  Official 
accounts accumulated nearly as many securities in value in the past three years as did the Federal 
Reserve in its much-vaunted experiment with quantitative easing.  That is, policies toward 
capital inflows and reserve accumulation among countries in the South have come to be as 
important in quantitative terms as the inward-looking policies of the central banks of the North. 
The willingness of emerging market economies to limit exchange rate fluctuations will be 
tested as monetary policy in advanced economies remains geared toward domestic 
considerations.  Meanwhile, some advanced economies will be looking to finance large deficits 
and to roll over large debts.  In that environment, prior reticence toward capital controls and 
other restrictions on finance may well lift.  Restrictions of finance, after all, create more captive 
 markets.  For emerging markets, this insulates them from monetary policy in advanced 
economies that may be inappropriate for domestic circumstances.  For advanced economies, this 
limits the competition for the debt they dearly have to sell.  In such a world, the policy tools 
discussed here in will be increasingly relied upon. 
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